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LOCKOUTS: AN ANALYSIS OF BOARD AND
COURT DECISIONS SINCE BROWN
AND AMERICAN SHIP*
Herbert N. Bernhardtt
One approaches the writing of an article about lockouts with a
good deal of caution. Some excellent scholars have applied themselves
to an analysis of American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB1 and NLRB v.
Brown2 and of the probable interpretations of these decisions by the
National Labor Relations Board and the courts.3 As a result of having
been more dilatory than some of these other authors, however, I have
the advantage of a somewhat greater number of decided cases. While
the decisions do not always clarify where the Board is going, they at
least tend to pinpoint the areas where further clarification is needed.
As Professor Summers pointed out soon after the decisions in these
two landmark cases, the validity of lockouts depends ultimately on
economic data and policy considerations that have not been explored.4
These issues have still not been fully examined by the Board or the
courts. Thus, there are difficulties in applying the formulas enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Brown and American Ship that the Board
and the courts have yet to acknowledge, let alone overcome.
The Board and the courts have, of course, decided the cases that
have come before them and in the process a number of the problems
* The author wishes to thank the Graduate Division of the New York University Law
School for its fellowship award and Professor Thomas G.S. Christensen for his critical re-
view.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore. B.S. 1956, Cornell University;
LL.B. 1961, Yale University; LL.M. 1971, New York University.
1 380 U.S. 300 (1965). See notes 55-61 and accompanying text infra.
2 80 U.S. 278 (1965). See notes 30-39 and accompanying text infra.
3 Baird, Lockout Law: The Supreme Court and the NLRB, 38 GEo. WASH. L. Rrv.
396 (1970); Dugano Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court-.1964 Term, 1965 ABA
SEc. LAB. REL. L. 101; Feldesman & Koretz, Lockouts, 46 BosroN U.L. REv. 329 (1966);
Freilicher, The Supportive Lockout, 19 SyAcusE L. REv. 599 (1968); Janofsky, New Con-
cepts in Interference and Discrimination Under the NLRA: The Legacy of American
Ship Building and Great Dane Trailers, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 81 (1970); Lev, Suggestions to
Management: The Lockout, 19 LAB. Lj. 80 (1968); Meltzer, The Lockout Cases, 1965 Sup.
Cr. Rxv. 87; Oberer, Lockouts and the Law: The Impact of Amercan Ship Building and
Brown Food, 51 Commru.L L.Q. 193 (1966); Rosen, The Evolution of the Lockout, 4 Su roLK
U.L. Rnv. 267 (1970); Ross, Lockouts: A New Dimension in Collective Bargaining, 7 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 847 (1966); Shawe, The Regenerated Status of the Employer's Lock-
out: A Comment on American Ship Building, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1124 (1966); Summers,
Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YALE L.J. 59 (1965).
4 Summers, supra note 3, at 74.
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foreseen by the .commentators have been resolved. Most of the Board
and circuit court decisions on lockouts, however, consist largely of a
statement of facts, a repetition of the Supreme Court language in Brown
and American Ship, and a statement of the result. In the average case,
where the issues are not closely balanced, this may be sufficient. Unfor-
tunately, however, the same format has been used in the close cases,
so that it is difficult to determine how the facts and issues were
evaluated.5
Nevertheless, many of the situations where a lockout is likely to
be used, including most of the situations where it has been used, are
covered by existing precedent. Accordingly, before berating the Board
any further for what it has not done, it would be best to analyze what
it has done. The cases so far decided by the Board may be grouped into
four categories: (1) multi-employer or common interest lockouts;
(2) bargaining lockouts; (3) lockouts in support of unfair practices; and
(4) attempts to invoke the protection of the lockout rule for other eco-
nomic sanctions by the employer.
I
MULTI-EMPLOYER AND COMMON INTEREST LOCKOUTS
Employers have often used lockouts to counter union whipsaw
strikes. 6 The employers' right to use a lockout to counter a strike
against one member of a multi-employer unit was established even
before'Brown and American Ship by the Buffalo Linen Supply Co.
case.7 -After Brown and American Ship the privilege was broadened
through development by the Board of a concept of "joint bargaining."
A. Common Interest Lockouts Before Brown and American Ship
Before Brown and American Ship lockouts were allowed only in
exceptional circumstances.8 For a time the Board refused to consider
5 Many lockout cases, of course, do not involve the dose questions of law which con-
cern the commentators. See generally P. Ross, TiE LABOR LAW iN ACtiON-AN ANALYSIs
OF THE ADJINiSTRATIVE PRocEss UNDER THE TAFr-HARTLY Acr 1 (1966).
6 In a, whipsaw strike, a union strikes one or more, but not all members of a multi-
employer unit or uses a similar tactic with a group of employers with whom it bargains
individually over the same terms at the same time. Because the employers are usually in
competition with each other the struck employer will lose business to the others if they
continue to operate. The union is thus able to bring enormous pressure upon the struck
-employer to settle. To prevent the union from picking them off one at a time, the em-
ployers find it advantageous to declare a joint lockout when the union strikes one of
'them.
. 7 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), rev'd sub nom. Truck Drivers Local 449 v. NLRB, 231 F.2d
110 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).




lockouts in defense of a multi-employer unit as involving exceptional
circumstances," despite contrary circuit court authority.10
In Buffalo Linen the Board changed course and allowed an excep-
tion for lockouts in defense of a multi-employer unit.11 The union in
Buffalo Linen had put into effect a whipsawing plan by striking one
member of a multi-employer unit that had been established for thirteen
years. The other employers in the unit responded by locking out their
employees but made no attempt to continue operations during the
lockout.
The Board's decision was reversed in the Second Circuit, and the
case was remanded.12 The Supreme Court, however, reinstated the
Board's decision and its new rule.13
The legislative history of the Wagner Act 14 and the language of
the Taft-Hartley Act, according to the Court, 5 indicated that lockouts
Some commentators have maintained that these exceptions were used to soften the
general prohibition against lockouts in any case in which the Board, for its own reasons,
did not want to apply the general rule. Meltzer, Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Shadows
on an Old Terrain, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 614, 623-28 (1961); Meltzer, Single-Employer and
Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 24 U. Cm. L. Rv. 70, 73-76, 97
(1956); Oberer, supra note 3, at 197-98.
9 Continental Baking Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 143 (1953); Spalding Avery Lumber Co., 103
N.L.R.B. 1516 (1953); Davis Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1952); Morand Bros.
Beverage Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1448, 1460-66 (1952).
10 NLRB v. Continental Baking Co., 221 F.2d 427, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1955); NLRB v.
Spalding Avery Lumber Co., 220 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1955); Leonard v. NLRB, 205 F.2d 355
(9th Cir. 1953); Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 1951).
In Morand the Seventh Circuit disapproved of the Board's lockout rule, but upheld a
finding of violation on the ground that the employees had been permanently discharged.
In Leonard, the Ninth Circuit also disapproved of the Board's rule and refused enforce-
ment. When Spalding Avery and Continental Baking came before the appellate tribunals,
the Board had already changed its position and sought enforcement on other grounds.
The courts, however, refused to accept the Board's new arguments and enforcement wa$
again denied.
11 Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954).
12 Truck Drivers Local 449 v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956).
13 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
14 The legislative history shows that the Wagner Act was "not for the purpose of
taking rights away from either party."
where are some fundamental rights an employer has .... No one can com-
pel an employer to keep his factory open. No one can compel an employer to pay
any particular wage. No one can compel an employer to hire others in addition to
those he sees fit to hire....
No one can keep an employer from closing down his factory and putting
thousands of men and women on the street. So in dealing with this bill we have
to recognize those fundamental things, and we have not gone into that domain.
79 CONG. REc. 7673 (1935) (remarks of Senator Walsh). The National Labor Relations Act
(Wagner Act) was approved July 5, 1935. Twelve years later it was amended and supple-
mented by the Taft-Hartley Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
15 The term "lock-out" is used in four sections of the Labor Management Relations
Act (Taft-Hartley Act) (29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970)): id. § 158(d)(4) (no resort to "strike or
lock-out" during 60-day notice period); id. § 173(c) (Director of Mediation Service to seek
1972]
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were not to be prohibited "as such."'16 Its decision, however, was
limited to the narrow question of "whether a temporary lockout may
lawfully be used as a defense to a union strike tactic which threatens
the destruction of the employers' interest in bargaining on a group
basis."'17 The Court stated that the right of employees to strike is not
"so absolute as to deny self-help by employers when legitimate interests
of employees and employers collide."' 8 The ultimate problem of bal-
ancing the conflicting interests was to be left to the Board and to be
subject to limited judicial review. Applying this standard, the Court
found that the balance struck by the Board in this case was correct. 9
The effect of Buffalo Linen as interpreted by the Board" was to
graft a new exception for lockouts in defense of a multi-employer unit
upon the general rule that lockouts were prohibited. This exception,
however, was not extended so far as to allow employers in a multi-
employer unit to use temporary replacements in response to a whipsaw
strike.21 Nor was it extended to situations where a formal multi-
employer unit had not been established, even though the employers
had a strong, common interest and were seeking in their negotiations
with the union to establish a multi-employer unit.22
The Board's reluctance to extend the exception embodied in
Buffalo Linen is illustrated by its decision in Topeka Grocers Manage-
ment Association,23 decided when Brown and American Ship were
pending before the Supreme Court. In Topeka non-struck members
of the multi-employer unit put their employees on a shortened work-
week, matching the level of operations that the struck employer was
to induce parties to settle dispute peacefully "without resort to strike, lock-out, or other
coercion"); id. § 176 (appointment of board of inquiry by President when "threatened or
actual strike or lock-out" creates a national emergency); and id. § 178 (power to enjoin
"strike or lock-out" in case of national emergency).
16 353 US. at 92.
'7 Id. at 93.
18 Id. at 96. The Court cited NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 833 (1938)
and some of the previous cases in which the Board and the courts had made an exception
to the general rule and found no violation in the use of a lockout.
19 353 U.S. at 97.
20 Professor Meltzer noted at the time that the Board might have read some of the
language in the decision as a direction to reconsider its whole approach to lockouts.
Meltzer, supra note 8, 28 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 618-19.
21 Food Giant Supermarkets, 145 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1964), dismissed, 154 N.L.R.B. 82
(1965); Kroger Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 235 (1963); Brown Food Store, 137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962),
enforcement denied sub nom. NLRB v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963), af'd, 380 U.S.
278 (1965).
22 Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 361 (1963), enforced, 340 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.
1965).
23 150 N.L.R.B. 938 (1965).
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able to achieve with the use of replacements. The trial examiner upheld
this tactic as a legitimate defense of the unit, citing as authority a con-
cession in the Board's brief to the Supreme Court in the Brown case.24
The Board, however, chose to avoid this issue, basing its decision solely25
on the rationale of Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc.26 that the reduction was
necessary to prevent the non-struck employers from being caught with
large inventories in case they too were struck.
The Board's last multi-employer unit lockout case before the
Supreme Court decisions in Brown and American Ship did, however,
involve some extension of the Buffalo Linen doctrine. The Natkin &
Co. decision 27 allowed non-struck members of a multi-employer bar-
gaining unit to lock out not only members of a craft, but also any other
craft members who refused to cross the picket line. In Natkin the iron
workers struck one member of a multi-employer bargaining unit. The
Board held that non-struck employers were privileged not only in lock-
ing out their own iron workers, but also in locking out all the other
crafts who had refused to cross the picket line. Such defensive action
had previously been allowed only when the original strike had been
illegal. 28 After Natkin, refusal to cross even a legal picket line could
privilege a defensive lockout against the refusing crafts by non-struck
employers in the multi-employer unit.
B. Lockouts in Multi-Employer Units after Brown and American
Ship
In American Ship, the Supreme Court declared that "use of the
lockout does not carry with it any necessary implication that the em-
24 Id. at 944.
25 Id. at 939 n.l.
26 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951). An early exception to the general rule that lockouts were
prohibited allowed lockouts which were "economically justified," that is, designed to pro-
tect an employer from peculiar economic loss or operational difficulty not usually suffered
by an employer subjected to a strike. See Oberer, supra note 3, at 196. In Betts Cadillac
a strike would have caught customers' disassembled automobiles in non-struck employers'
repair shops. The lockout was allowed as a defense against the loss of good will such a
strike would have caused,
In Topeka the Board accepted the trial examiner's finding of an extraordinary
potential economic hardship: the possibility that the employers would be "caught with
large inventories of perishable meat products." 150 N.L.R.B. at 945.
27 150 N.L.R.B. 1542 (1965).
28 Publishers' Ass'n, 139 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1962), af'd sub nom. New York Mailers'
Union No. 6 v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1964). See Hearst Corp., 161 N.L.R.B. 1405
(1966), aff'd sub nom. News Union v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1968); News Union v.
Hearst, 278 F. Supp. 423 (D.C. Md. 1968) (same case brought under section 301 of the




ployer acted to discourage union membership or otherwise discriminate
against union members as such."29 Read together, Brown and American
Ship established that, absent evidentiary findings of hostile motive and
unless the lockout in the particular circumstances of the case is "demon-
strably so destructive of employee rights and.., devoid of significant
service to any legitimate business end,"30 a lockout is a legitimate tech-
nique of an employer. Thus, the effect of the two decisions was to
rescind the general prohibition against lockouts.
The specific holding of Brown was that employers in a multi-
employer unit using a lockout to counter a whipsaw strike were per-
mitted to use temporary replacements. The Brown case involved an
association of food retailers who had bargained with the union success-
fully on a group basis for many years. In response to a whipsaw strike
the non-struck members of the employer group declared a lockout.
Both the non-struck employers and the struck employer continued
operations with the use of temporary replacements. The Board had
found that this lockout, together with the use of temporary replace-
ments, violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA).3 1 The Tenth Circuit, however, refused to enforce
the Board's order.32 The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals,
reversing the Board.33
The Court observed that the replacements were used only for the
duration of the labor dispute; that the lockout would have been ter-
minated at any time the union agreed to management's terms; and that
the union was protected from loss of membership by a union shop
clause.34 The Court continued:
Under all these circumstances, we cannot say that the employers'
conduct had any great tendency to discourage union membership.
Not only was the prospect of discouragement of membership com-
paratively remote, but the respondents' attempt to remain open for
29 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 312 (1965).
30 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 286 (1965); see also American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965).
31 Brown Food Store, 137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962).
82 NLRB v.-Brown, 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963).
33 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
34 The whipsaw strike in Brown was called by the union after agreement had been
reached on all terms of a new collective bargaining agreement, except regarding the
amount and effective date of a wage increase. A union shop provision was one of the
terms already agreed to when the strike and lockout occurred. That the stores would be
union shops, and that the employees had been expressly advised that replacements were
only for the duration of the labor dispute, meant that the employees had "nothing to
gain, and much to lose" if they quit the union. This would hardly discourage union mem-
bership. Id. at 289.
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business with the help of temporary replacements was a measure
reasonably adapted to the achievement of a legitimate end-pre-
serving the integrity of the multi-employer bargaining unit.3 5
The Court then applied a rationale similar to that it had used in
deciding American Ship the same day.80
When the resulting harm to employee rights is thus compara-
tively slight, and a substantial and legitimate business end is served,
the employers' conduct is prima fade lawful. Under these circum-
stances the finding of an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(3) re-
quires a showing of improper subjective intent.8 7
Finding no evidence of antiunion animus, but on the contrary that the
union and the employer had an amicable relationship, the Court con-
cluded that there was insufficient evidence to find a violation. 8
Although the Brown decision went beyond Buffalo Linen, the
scope of permissible common interest lockouts would still have been
narrow had the case been limited to its facts. First, each employer
locked out all of his employees; second, all locked out employees were
members of the union; third, the lockout lasted only as long as the
strike; fourth, only temporary replacements were allowed; and finally,
the common interest was based upon an established multi-employer
bargaining unit. Cases decided since Brown have extended its rationale
and have called some of these factual limitations into question.
Immediately after the Supreme Court's decisions in Brown and
American Ship the Board reconsidered two previous cases docketed for
review by circuit courts, which were decided under the Board's rule8 9
that an employer who had locked out to protect a multi-employer unit
could not use temporary replacements.40 One of these, Food Giant
Supermarkets,41 was found to be controlled in all respects by the deci-
sion in Brown, and the union's complaint was dismissed by supple-
85 Id. at 289 (footnote omitted).
86 See text accompanying note 29 supra.
ST 880 U.S. at 289.
88 Id. at 289-90.
389 See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
40 By temporarily replacing employees at a time when they were willing to work and
not on strike, the employer was deemed to: (1) interfere with, restrain, and coerce the
employees in the exercise of their right to bargain collectively and strike in furtherance of
economic demands, violating Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a)(1)
(29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970)); and (2) discriminate unlawfully in regard to tenure of
employment to discourage employees from supporting the union and engaging in con-
certed activities for mutual aid and protection, violating Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a)(3) (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(8) (1970)). See Food Giant Supermarkets,
145 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1224 (1964) (trial examiner's decision adopted by the Board).
41 154 N.L.R.B. 82 (1965). .
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mental decision and order of the Board. The other, Kroger Co., is
arguably distinguishable from Brown both because the employers con-
tinued their lockout several days past the end of the whipsaw strike
and because they selectively locked out only those employees repre-
sented by the union which had struck. The Board, however, dismissed
the case without opinion and without considering either of these is-
sues.
48
In Acme Markets, Inc." an employer was allowed to take lockout
action in defense of a multi-employer unit against nonunit and, indeed,
nonunion employees. When Acme, a member of a multi-employer
unit, was struck by the union, other employer members of the unit
declared a lockout. Acme also had nonunit stores which were in direct
competition with some of the stores closed by other employer members
of the unit. These nonunit stores were closed to avoid gaining an unfair
competitive advantage, thus undermining the integrity of the unit.
Acme's conduct was found not to constitute a violation of the NLRA.
Noting that the locked out nonunit employees were protected from
42 145 N.L.R.B. 235 (1963), remanded, No. 14-CA-2382 (D.C. Cir. 1965), complaint dis-
missed, Oct. 19, 1965. The unreported court of appeals decision and final disposition by
the Board were obtained through correspondence. Letter from Thomas W. Miller, Director
of Information, NLRB, to the Author, Feb. 27, 1970.
43 The general counsel never argued in Kroger that the selective lockout constituted
an unfair labor practice. He did, however, argue that the continuation of the lockout
past the end of the whipsaw strike was a violation. 145 N.L.R.B. at 240. This contention,
however, appears never to have been considered by the Board.
In the original decision, before the Supreme Court opinions in Brown and American
Ship, the trial examiner found not only that the use of replacements during the lockout
constituted an unfair labor practice but also that the lockout violated the Act from its
inception because it was not defensive. Id. at 242. The trial examiner used the fact that
the lockout had continued past the end of the strike to support this latter finding. Id. at
242-43.
The Board upheld the examiner's decision that the lockout with replacements vio-
lated the Act but did not affirm his finding that the lockout violated the Act from its
inception. The Board in a footnote (id. at 236 n.2) explains that no such allegation
originally had been made by the general counsel and that in any case since the charge
had been filed more than six months after the inception of the lockout it was now barred
by section 10(b) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970). While the general counsel had alleged
to the trial examiner that the continuation of the lockout past the end of the strike
constituted a violation, and this contention was certainly not barred by 10(b), he ap-
parently did not reargue this position before the Board.
After the Supreme Court decisions in Brown and American Ship the Board asked the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals to remand the Kroger case for reconsideration.
The court did so and the Board dismissed the case on the basis of those two Supreme
Court opinions. Letter from Thomas W. Miller, supra note 42. There is no public record
of any consideration given at that time to the issues raised by the continuation of the
lockout past the end of the strike.
44 156 N.L.R.B. 1452 (1966).
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financial loss during the lockout,45 the Board emphasized its finding
that Acme's purpose was to preserve the integrity of the multi-employer
unit. Citing both Brown and American Ship, the Board concluded:
In sum, as the lockout here was designed to serve the legitimate
business end of protecting the integrity of the multiemployer unit,
we do not view the Respondent's conduct here complained of as
"demonstrably so destructive of employee rights" or "inherently so
prejudicial to union interests and so devoid of significant economic
justification that no specific evidence of intent to discourage union
membership or other anti-union animus is required." And as the
record here contains no such specific evidence of hostile motivation
or discriminatory intent, we conclude that the Respondent has not
violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.46
There is no doubt that the combined effect of Brown and Ameri-
can Ship is to allow employees increased flexibility in defense of a
multi-employer unit. A number of important questions as to just how
much flexibility employers have, however, remains unresolved. For
example, will employers be permitted to continue a lockout with re-
placements after the end of a whipsaw strike? Employers were per-
mitted to do this in the Kroger case, but there is no record of the
Board considering the issue.47 A lockout with replacements past the
end of a whipsaw strike could be construed as a bargaining lockout
with replacements and, therefore, an unfair labor practice under the
Board's Inland Trucking rule.48 If, however, what has happened is that
the struck employer has given in to the union's terms, then by denying
the right of the other employers to continue a lockout with replace-
ments, the Board would be providing unions with an effective tool for
destroying the employers' united front. Thus, if the union correctly
selected those employers who were most likely to capitulate quickly
it could strike them one at a time with the other employers privileged
to use a lockout with replacements only during the period of the
strikes. A rule which attempted to distinguish between such a situation
and one where the bargaining association was taking advantage of the
union's strike to force its terms would be impossible to apply. Accord-
ingly, the best rule would appear to be that as long as they do not
deliberately attempt to undermine the union, employers in a multi-
45 The nonunit employees affected by the lockout were given "inventory or other
such work in their own stores or work in other stores which remained open," and where
insufficient work was available to afford the employees their usual income, the employer
made up the difference. Id. at 1454-55.
46 Id. at 1458 (footnotes omitted).
47 See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
48 See notes 81-92 & 155 and accompanying text infra.
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employer unit should be privileged to continue a lockout, with replace-
ments, started in response to a whipsaw strike until full settlement is
reached. Of course, if the union and the association had agreed on terms,
a continued lockout or even a failure to subscribe to those terms by any
employer member of the unit would be an unfair labor practice.4 9
Where the union represents only some of the employees, the action
the non-struck employers may take depends upon whether or not the
other employees cross the picket line. If as in Kroger the non-striking
employees continue to work for the struck employer, other employer
members should be able to lock out only the members of the striking
union, replacing them temporarily but otherwise continuing with their
regular employees. In this way the struck employer's situation is dupli-
cated by the locking out employers for the duration of the strike and
lockout.
Where employees other than those represented by the striking
union refuse to cross the picket line, employers under Natkin may
lock out all those employees. Although the case has not yet arisen, it
would seem that employers should also be privileged to replace these
employees temporarily as long as there is an absence of antiunion ani-
mus. Such use of replacements would serve the same economic purpose
as in Brown, that is, continuing operations in the entire multi-employer
unit in the face of a whipsaw strike. Employees in all departments are
necessary to continue operations, and other union members would
probably be less willing to work where a sister union has been locked
out than they would be if the other union were merely on strike.
The Acme decision permits employers to shut down a nonunit
enterprise when allowing it to stay open would undermine the em-
ployers' united front against the union's whipsaw tactic. This privilege
should be available only where the unit enterprises are shut down and
not where they are operating with temporary replacements.
Finally, the Topeka case" suggests the very interesting question of
the validity of a partial lockout by a non-struck employer. The resulting
partial shutdown would attempt to match the level of operations of a
struck employer who is able to continue functioning, only on a partial
basis. The locking out employers should be free to limit their lockout
to members of the union that had called the strike, and to continue
operations using their regular employees and temporary replacements
49 Service Roofing Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 321 (1968); see NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, 357
F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966).




for the locked out employees. Presumably they would also be free to
shut down any operations where the locked out employees were needed
and to lay off any additional employees who could not be used because
of reduced operations. Referring to the Board's decision in Brown, the
trial examiner in Topeka construed the partial shutdown not as a par-
tial lockout for the purpose of arranging for temporary replacements,
but simply as an attempt by the non-struck employers to put themselves
"in the same boat" with the struck employer, thus protecting the whole
unit.51 Topeka approved this tactic where no replacements were hired.
It would seem that after the Brown decision, the use of temporary' re-
placements to continue operating on a partial basis should be allowed.
The partial lockout by laying off some of the employees would seem to
be unobjectionable provided that layoffs followed contractual seniority
and employees were offered full reinstatement once the dispute was
over. Indeed, a recent Board decision indicates that the employer would
not necessarily have to follow contractual seniority.62 The effects of
such a tactic would be no more severe than those of the layoff with
temporary replacements allowed in Brown.
An attempt to reduce operations by reducing the number of hours
per employee might run into the objections raised in United States
Pipe & Foundry Co.53 If for any reason the employees found the re-
duced work schedule worse than no work at all, their only alternativre
would be to strike and face the possibility 6f permanent replacement.
Thus, such a partial lockout might be more destructive of employee
rights than the total lockout vith temporary replacements allowed in
Brown. If, however, employees "were given the option of taking the
reduced hours or a temporary, layoff, there could be no such objec-
tion.14
51 See 150 N.L.R.B. at 943. .
52 Laclede Gas. Co., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 32, 75 L.R.R.M. 1483 (Dec. 14, 1970). But see
text accompanying notes 222-29 infra.53 180 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 73 L.R.R.M. 1260 (Dec. 16, 1969), enforced sub nom. Molders
Local 155 v. NLRB, 76 L.R.R.M. 2133 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 5, 1971). See text accompanying
notes 218-21 infra. The Board did-decide one case involving a partial lockout through a
reduction of hours. Great Falls Employers' Council, 123 N.L.R.B. 974 (1959). It does not
seem, however, that the issues raised in United States Pipe were considered in that deci-
sion. The Board's finding of violation on other grounds was reversed by the Ninth Circuit
(NLRB v. Great Falls Employers' Council, 277 F.2d 772. (9th Cir. 1960)). See Meltzer, supra
note 8, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 622-23.
54 An employer may, of course, choose to maintain his normal level of operations in
the face of increased demand resulting from a strike at a competitor. See, e.g., Southern




C. Common Interest Lockouts not Involving a Multi-Employer Unit
Recent decisions relying on American Ship as well as Brown have
indicated a broader concept of valid common interest lockouts in situ-
ations not involving a formal multi-employer bargaining unit.
In American Ship a single employer laid off his employees during
his slack season after reaching an impasse with the union in negotia-
tions and fearing that a strike would be called as soon as ships were
taken into the yard.55 The employer had bargained with the union for
a period of nine years and each previous agreement had been preceded
by a strike. The trial examiner found that in view of the potentially
disruptive effects of a strike while ships were in the yard, the employer's
action was justified under the Betts Cadillac rationale. 6 The Board
overruled the examiner's decision on the basis of what it regarded as
adequate assurances by union officials that they would endeavor to
avoid a strike and would complete any work in the yard if a strike did
occur.5 7 The Board's decision was affirmed by the District of Columbia
Circuit.58
The Supreme Court reversed the Board and the court of appeals
and enunciated an entirely new rule.59 This rule allowed the "tempo-
rary layoff of employees solely as a means to bring economic pressure to
bear in support of the employer's bargaining position, after an impasse
has been reached." 60 The opinion expressly avoided the issue of
whether an employer would be permitted to use replacements in order
to continue to operate during such a bargaining lockout.61 Under this
new rule the Board's differences with the trial examiner became ir-
relevant. Employers were privileged to use the lockout not only de-
fensively but also offensively in an attempt to secure legitimate bar-
gaining demands.
A further question unanswered by American Ship is whether the
offensive lockout can be utilized to preserve a common position among
employers also bargaining individually in the face of union demands
and whipsaw pressures. The first indication that the Board might
sanction a common interest lockout where there was no valid multi-
55 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 302-04 (1965).
56 American Ship Bldg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362, 1382-83 (1963).
57 Id. at 1364-65. Note the criticism leveled by Justice Goldberg at the Board's find-
ing. 380 U.S. at 327 (concurring opinion).
58 Boilermakers Local 374 v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
59 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S.. 300 (1965).
60 Id. at 308.
61 Id. at n.8.
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employer bargaining unit came in Weyerhaeuser C0. 62 That case
involved an attempt by a group of employers who had previously bar-
gained individually to establish a multi-employer bargaining unit.
When the union struck two of the six employers involved, the others de-
clared a lockout. The trial examiner found that they had successfully
established a multi-employer unit and that their lockout was authorized
under Buffalo Linen. The Board ruled that it was not necessary to
determine whether a valid multi-employer unit was established since
all six employers had reached impasse in joint bargaining with the
union and were, therefore, privileged in declaring a lockout under
American Ship. The District of Columbia Circuit remanded to the
Board, noting that additional argument should be taken if the case
were to be decided on grounds different from those originally argued.63
The court also criticized the lack of clarity of the new proposition put
forward by the Board.64 On remand the Board specifically found that a
multi-employer unit had been established. The Board also reaffirmed
its initial position that a lockout is permissible, even in the absence of
a multi-employer unit, where a group of employers jointly bargain to
impasse and the union strikes some but not all members of the group.6 5
The Board did not, however, fully indicate how such joint bargaining
might differ from a formal multi-employer bargaining unit.6 6 The
District of Columbia Circuit upheld the Board on the basis of its find-
ing that a multi-employer bargaining unit had been established without
passing on the Board's other ground of decision. 67
The Detroit News case68 is the only case in which a lockout based
62 155 N.L.R.B. 921 (1965), remanded sub nom. Woodworkers' Union v. NLRB, 865
F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1966), on remand, 166 N.L.R.B. 299 (1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 770 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
63 365 F.2d at 935, 939.
64 Id. at 937-38.
65 166 N.L.R.B. at 301.
66 The Board used the following language:
In view of the court's request for further explication of our view of joint bargain-
ing, particularly in the present context, we turn now to the essential components
of the bargaining conducted in the instant case. All six members of the Association
advanced a common bargaining position through a single designated representa-
tive, a fact recognized by the Unions. The Unions in turn made common demands
through the Association, which we here treat as their (the Employers) joint agent,
upon all six Employers. Further, as noted above, each of the six Employers had
committed itself from the outset of bargaining to be fully bound by any agree-
ment reached on its behalf by the Association, and each of the Unions was so
advised at the commencement of the respective negotiations.
Id. at 302 (footnote omitted).
67 398 F.2d at 773.
68 Evening News Ass'n, 145 N.L.R.B. 996 (1964), enforcement denied sub nom. Detroit
Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLR.B, 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965), vacated and remanded,
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on -a common interest -among employers was expressly upheld in the
absence of a multi-employer bargaining unit. Detroit News involved
two employers, The Evening News Association, owner and publisher of
the Detroit News, and Knight Newspapers, Inc., owner and publisher
of the Detroit Free Press, who had traditionally bargained with a num-
ber of unions in multi-employer units but had bargained individually
with the Teamsters Union. During bargaining in 1962, the Teamsters
Union presented a number of similar demands to the two employers.
In a secret agreement, the News agreed that if the Free Press were
struck because of its refusal to concede to any of three demands which
the employers regarded as crucial, the News would support the Free
Press and would not publish. When the Free Press was struck by the
Teamsters, the News locked out its employees and ceased operations
until an agreement was reached with the union.
The Board's initial decision, which preceded Brown and American
Ship, was that "an agreement to engage in supportive lockout action by
employers who do not bargain jointly in a multi-employer unit con-
templates conduct which exceeds the permissible defensive limits under
Buffalo Linen."69 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and
denied enforcement of the Board's order, citing the language in Amer-
ican Ship that "'where the intention proven is merely to bring about
a settlement of a labor dispute on favorable terms, no violation of §
8 (a) (3) is shown.' "0 Adopting the suggestion of the Board, the Su-
preme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its
opinion in American Ship."1
On remand the Board reversed itself in a somewhat confusing
opinion. It noted that American Ship was" 'concerned with ... the use
of a temporary layoff of employees solely as a means to bring economic
pressure to bear in support of the employer's bargaining position after
an impasse has been reached.' "72 The Board then went on to say that
"the reasoning of the Court must obviously be taken into account in
deciding a case such as the ifistant one, even though it does not present
the exact situation present in American Ship."73 In what significant
882 U.S. 874 (1966), on remand, 166 N.L.R.B. 219 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Newspaper
Drivers' Local 372 Y. NLRB, 404 F2f 1159 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 895 U.S. 928
(1969)._
69 145 N.L.R.B. at 1000 (footnote omitted).
70 8.46 F.2d at 531, quoting American Ship Bldg., Co. v. NLRB, 880 US. 800, 313
(1965).
71 Memorandum for NLRB at 7, Newspaper Drivers' Local 872 v. Detroit Newspaper
Publishers Ass'n, 882 US. 874 (1966).
2 .7a166 N.L:R.B. at.22l, quoting -380 U.S. at 308.
..... 166 N.L.R-.B.-at 221... ... .. -, - -
[Vol. 57:211
respects this case differed from American Ship, however, was not made
clear. The Board noted that the lockout was designed to force the
union to accept the employer's bargaining proposals, that the News was
seeking to promote its own bargaining interests as well as to lend sup-
port to the Free Press, that both the union and the News regarded
"their negotiations as being deadlocked on key issues, and that neither
doubted that a work stoppage would be required to break the dead-
lock." 74 The Board stated that not all supportive lockouts or lockouts
in support of a bargaining position were lawful, but that all cases had
to be decided on their facts in accordance with the decisions of the
Supreme Court. 75 This time the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the Board, holding that the lockout was authorized by American Ship,
and stating that the words "impasse" and "deadlock" were synony-
mous.
76
In David Friedland Painting Co.,77 an employer's asserted common
interest was found to be too attenuated to justify a lockout. Friedland
was signatory to a collective bargaining agreement with Painters Local
1221. He had, however, hired nine painters who were members of
Painters Local 144 because Local 1221 had no men available for work.
At the time Friedland desired additional employees, Local 144 was
engaged in negotiations with the painting contractors in its jurisdiction,
who were represented by the Master Associated Painters of Perth Am-
boy and Vicinity. Friedland was not a member of the Perth Amboy
association and took no part in the negotiations with Local 144. His
sole connection with the negotiations was a provision of his contract
with Local 1221 which required him to comply with the provisions of
other Local contracts when working out of Local 1221's area, which he
was not doing at the time. After an impasse had been reached in nego-
tiations, Local 144 called a strike against the Perth Amboy association.
Friedland then locked out his nine Local 144 employees for three days.
Instead of shutting down his work, Friedland continued with his re-
maining employees, some of whom were members of Local 1221.78
The trial examiner rejected the employer's contention that his
conduct came within Buffalo Linen and Brown. Friedland was not a
member of the Perth Amboy unit, nor were the members acting as his
agents. The New Jersey association of which he was a member and his
74 Id. at 221-22.
75 Id. at 222.
.76 Newspaper Drivers' Local 372 v. NLR3B, 404 F.2d 1159, 1160-61 (6th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 923 (1969).
77 158 N.L.R.B. 571 (1966), enforced, 377 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1967).
78 Id. at 573-76.
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local area association were not only not engaged in the bargaining but,
contrary to Friedland's contention, had not enunciated a uniform
policy sanctioning the lockout in which Friedland had engaged.
The trial examiner also rejected Friedland's contentions under
American Ship. Friedland was not engaged in bargaining with Local
144 and therefore he was not seeking to advance his own bargaining
position. To allow such a tenuous interest as his to justify intrusion
into negotiations by a lockout would lead to chaos in industrial rela-
tions. The Board adopted the trial examiner's opinion 79 and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order.80
Finally, the recently decided case of Inland Trucking Co.s1 bears
upon the issue of common interest lockouts, although the case did not
involve either a formal multi-employer unit or a whipsaw strike. Three
employers who had bargained jointly with the union declared a lockout
after their current contracts with the union expired and negotiations
were at impasse. During the lockout, the employers continued their
operations through the use of temporary replacements. The union
charged that both the lockout and the use of replacements constituted
a violation of the NLRA. The general counsel argued only that the use
of replacements constituted a violation.82
The trial examiner found it unnecessary to pass upon the issue of
whether and to what extent an employer might be justified in taking
action to support another employer's bargaining position. He found
that
each of the Respondents had sufficient immediate interest in the
bargaining to take appropriate and legitimate action in aid of the
bargaining which was being conducted, in their own interest. The
issue is whether the action taken, the employment and use of re-
placements to do the work of employees who had been locked out
of their normal employment, constituted such appropriate and
legitimate conduct, or contravened the rights of employees in viola-
tion of the Act.83
In an opinion later adopted by the Board, the examiner found
that use of temporary replacements tended to undermine employee
rights under the Act. He distinguished the use of temporary replace-
ments allowed in Brown on two grounds. First, employer action in
79 Id. at 572.
80 377 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1967).
81 179 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 72 L.R.R.M. 1486 (Oct. 27, 1969), enforced, 440 F.2d 562 (7th
Cir. 1971).
82 72 L.R.R.M. at 1486-87.
83 Id. at 1488 (footnote omitted).
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Brown was defensive in that it was in response to the union's strike.
Second, the union could bring an end to the lockout in Brown by end-
ing the strike. 4 In this case the union could end the lockout only by
acceding to the employer's demands, a situation which the examiner
found so destructive of collective bargaining as to take the case outside
the ambit of Brown and American Ship.85 As direct evidence of the
tendency of this lockout to undermine the union, the examiner ob-
served that a number of employees had quit. He further noted that such
losses may be particularly damaging where "no long-established back-
ground of stable bargaining relationships [has] been established."8 6
The examiner held87 that even with a "comparatively slight"
invasion of employee rights "it becomes incumbent upon the employer
to 'come forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business
justifications for the conduct.' ",8 In both American Ship and Darling
& Co. 9 the employers had reason to fear a strike, whereas "[i]n the
instant case ... there is no substantial evidence of any affirmative or
overt act on the part of the Union which impelled Respondents' con-
duct."90 The union had not previously struck during the busy season,
and the employers faced no unusual competitive circumstances at the
time. The examiner concluded that the lack of a current contract did
not constitute sufficient reason to justify the lockout and the use of
temporary replacements.
The examiner disagreed with the respondents' contention that the
Board had no "authority to pass upon the sufficiency of the business
reasons advanced to justify their conduct."91 He ruled that a lockout
with replacements " 'carrie[s] its own indicia of [illegal] intent and...
is barred by the Act unless saved from illegality by an overriding busi-
84 Id. at 1489.
85 Id.
86 Id. (footnote omitted).
87 Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court's earlier decision in NLR.B v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., 888 U.S. 26 (1967).
88 72 L.R.R.M. at 1490.
89 171 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 68 L.R.R.M. 1183 (May 28, 1968), aff'd sub nom. Lane v.
NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969); See notes 134-48 and accompanying text infra.
90 72 L.R.R.M. at 1490. Indeed, the union had specifically notified the employers
that it was not planning a strike. Id. at 1487.
91 Id. at 1491. The respondents were evidently relying upon the language in American
Ship and Brown "that the Act does not constitute the Board as an 'arbiter of the sort of
economic weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining
demands."' NLRB v. Brown, 880 U.S. 278, 288 (1965), quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents'




ness purpose justifying the invasion of union rights.' 92 He found no
such overriding business purpose in the instant case.
No clear concept has been developed by the Board distinguishing
a joint bargaining lockout from a lockout in a multi-employer bargain-
ing unit or a lockout in individual bargaining. In Weyerhaeuser the
Board referred to a concept of joint bargaining, but since that case
ultimately involved a valid multi-employer bargaining unit, the dimen-
sions of the concept were not clarified. In the Detroit News decision, on
the other hand, the Board did not mention joint bargaining, but rather
analyzed the case in terms of a lockout of union members in support of
the company's own bargaining position after negotiations were dead-
locked. In fact, however, the lockout was partly in support of the
bargaining position of another employer.
There are two types of cases where development of a joint bargain-
ing concept would make a significant difference: (1) cases where an
employer not presently engaged in bargaining with a union wishes to
declare a lockout in support of another employer with whom he has a
common economic interest in opposing the union's demands; and (2)
cases where employers engaging in joint bargaining but not in a formal
multi-employer unit wish not only to declare a lockout but also to use
temporary replacements. 93
The first situation was presented by Friedland, and the Board's
decision in that case appears to be correct. Allowing an employer who is
not even bargaining with the union to declare a lockout runs counter to
the basic NLRA policy to encourage bargaining. 94 Moreover, a contrary
decision might undermine recent cases that have broadened the em-
ployer's duty to consult with the union before taking action.95 The
proper remedy for an employer such as Friedland would be to assert his
92 72 L.R.R.M. at 1491, quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 378 U.S. 221, 281 (1963).
93 Until the recent decision in Darling & Co., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 68 L.R.R.M. 1133
(May 23, 1968), aff'd sub nom. Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969), another im-
portant difference might have been the requirement of impasse in cases not involving a
multi-employer unit. Darling, however, provided the final answer as to whether impasse
was required for a bargaining lockout. See text accompanying notes 134-48 infra.
.94 The policy of the NLRA has been stated by the Supreme Court as follows:
The National Labor Relations Act is designed to promote industrial peace by en-
couraging the making of voluntary agreements governing relations between unions and
employers.... The theory of the Act is that the making of voluntary labor agree-
ments is encouraged by protecting the employees' rights to organize for collective
bargaining and by imposing on labor and management the mutual obligation to
bargain collectively.
NLRB v. American Natl Ins. Co., 343 US. 395, 401-02 (1952) (footnote omitted).95 See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 1-80' N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), rev'd, 188
N.L.R.B. 550 (1962);' enforced sub-nom.-Machinists' Lobal 1304 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411
(D.C. Cir. 1963), aff'd, 879 U.S. 208 (1964).
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right to bargain with the union concerning terms and conditions of
employment.98 Once bargaining has been established, a lockout may
later be available under Brown or American Ship. Such an approach
would be consistent with the general policy of the NLRA, which re-
quires the parties to bargain but not necessarily to agree.
The second situation would arise where employers engaged in joint
bargaining, but not members of a multi-employer unit, wished to en-
gage in a lockout with the use of temporary replacements to counter a
whipsaw strike. This is a decision the Board has not yet had to face.9T
The Board would not, however, need a special category of joint bar-
gaining to cover it. The language of Inland Trucking is sufficiently
flexible to allow the use of temporary replacements in any situation
where the Board regards the employer interest involved as sufficiently-
important to justify some damage to employee rights. Thus temporary
replacements might be allowed where the employer had reason to fear
a strike or was faced with unusual competitive pressures. Both situa-
tions are more likely to occur where the union is attempting to use
whipsaw tactics against a number of employers in an industry.
Although it may sometimes require definition at its boundaries, 9
the concept of multi-employer bargaining has a settled meaning. Parties
know when they engage in bargaining through or with a formal multi-
employer unit, and such bargaining is voluntary on both sides. If the
privilege of using temporary replacements is extended beyond multi-
employer units, the Board will have to determine exactly when em-
ployers should be allowed this privilege. Such definitional problems
would require a form of sophisticated economic analysis not previously
attempted under the NLRA. 9 Even economic analysis, however, will
98 Friedland's contract with Local 1221 required him to follow the agreements of
other Locals when working in their area. See text accompanying note 78 supra. Insistence
to the point of impasse in negotiations on a clause going beyond Local 1221's area of
representation, however, would violate § 8(b)(5). Painters' Local 164, 126 N.L.R.B. 997
(1960), enforced on other grounds, 293 F.2d 13 (D.C.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961).
Furthermore, for any union to insist that an employer sign an agreement without bar-
gaining about its terms is a violation of § 8(b)(8). Plasterers' & Cement Masons' Local 2,
149 N.L.R.B. 1264 (1964).
97 The Board in Inland Trucking found a violation in a joint lockout with replace-
ments by a group of employers in a situation not involving either a multi-employer unit
or a whipsaw strike. The finding of violation, however, was closely limited to the facts
of that case. See text accompanying notes 81-92 supra.
98 Eg., compare Evening News Ass'n, 119 N.L.R.B. 345 (1957) and Furniture Employ-
ers' Council, 96 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1951), with Bagel & Baily Bakeries' Council, 175 N.L.R.B.
No. 148, 71 L.R.R.M. 1148 (May 8, 1969).
99 Cf. Gross, Economics, Politics, and the Law: The, NLRB's Division of Economic
Research, 1935-1940, 55 CoREu L. Rzv. 321 (1970). - :,: ..
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not be useful without a much clearer formulation than we now have of
policy goals in this area.100
A number of policy issues are apparent. On the one hand, if the
Board attempts to establish a hard and fast rule that temporary re-
placements can be used only by a multi-employer unit, the result may
be to encourage unions to withdraw from such units'0 1 and to attempt
to achieve similar benefits from pattern bargaining. On the other hand,
a lockout with the use of temporary replacements may have coercive
effects upon employees, and the Board may not wish to sanction it
where unions have not voluntarily entered into multi-employer bar-
gaining. 02 In addition, there are issues as to the use of temporary
replacements even in a multi-employer unit that still have not been
settled by the Board. Defining a clear set of guidelines for this area will
pose a difficult but unavoidable problem for the Board.
D. Other Issues in Common Interest Lockouts
Other issues relating to the common interest lockout include the
use of a lockout to force multi-employer bargaining, the use of perma-
nent replacements, and possible antitrust implications of this type of
lockout.
The Board faced the issue of an employer attempting to force multi-
employer bargaining by a lockout in the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co. case,103 decided shortly before Brown and American Ship. Adopting
the conclusions of the trial examiner, the Board held that the use of a
lockout to force a change from single to multi-employer bargaining was
violative of the NLRA. In the context of the Board's position at the
time that only defensive lockouts were privileged,10 4 the decision that
the lockout was an unfair labor practice was an easy one. Even after
American Ship and Brown, however, the decision retains its vitality.
Multi-employer bargaining is voluntary with both employers 0 5 and
100 See Jones, Legal Regulation and Economic Analysis, in LAW IN A CHmAGING A~MR.
icA 75, 95-96 (G. Hazard ed. 1968).
101 Great AUt. & Pac. Tea Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 361 (1963), enforced in part, 340 F2d 690
(2d Cir. 1965).
102 See text accompanying notes 81-92 supra.
103 145 N.L.R.B. 361 (1963), enforced in part, 340 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965).
104 Notes 68-75 and accompanying text supra.
105 Under recent Board rulings, unions are free either to withdraw totally from multi-
employer bargaining (Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 210 (1965), affd sub
nom. Publishers' Ass'n v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 293 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966);
Evening News Ass'n, 154 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1965), enforced sub nom. Detroit Newspaper
Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967)) or to select certain employers from
an established multi-employer unit with whom they may demand individual bargaining
(Pacific Coast Ass'n, 163 N.LR.B. 892 (1967)).
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unions'0 6 free to withdraw upon proper notice. Moreover, the Board
has recently held that it is improper for a union to insist that an
employer join a multi-employer unit.107 To allow employers to use a
lockout to pressure unions into multi-employer bargaining would des-
troy this symmetry of voluntary action.108
The Supreme Court in Brown explicitly refused to consider
whether the use of permanent replacements in a lockout in defense of a
multi-employer unit is a violation of the NLRA.10 9 Such a tactic would
appear to constitute a violation, however, because of its effect upon indi-
vidual employees. The extra pressures brought to bear upon the union
itself could be considered to be "no more than the result of the
[union's] inability to make effective use of the whipsaw tactic.""n0 Indi-
vidual employees, however, would suffer the harsh consequences of re-
placement. In the ordinary strike situation an employee can avoid
replacement by not supporting the strike."' Although he may be tem-
porarily replaced under Brown regardless of his position on the strike,
he would not be nearly so damaged as he would be by a permanent
replacement.
There does not appear to be any overriding business purpose which
would justify such an infringement of employee rights. In response to
a whipsaw strike, employers are free under Brown to lock out em-
ployees and to maintain operations using supervisors, nonunit em-
ployees, and temporary replacements. Alternatively, an employer may
stay open and seek to cushion revenue losses by some mutual aid strike
plan. 1 2 These remedies are adequate to protect employers' interests.
Employees who engage in a common interest lockout may be sub-
ject to antitrust prosecution under the rationale of UMW v. Penning-
ton.1 3 While that decision specifically excepts multi-employer bargain-
ing units from the strictures of the antitrust lawsn 4 it does rule that
employers and unions may be subject to prosecution where they seek to
impose wages and conditions on employers and employees outside the
bargaining unit." 5
106 Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 361 (1963).
107 Southern Cal. Pipe Trades Dist. Council 16, 167 N.L.R.B. 1004 (1967).
108 See Evening News Ass'n, 154 N.L.R.B. 1494, 1498 (1965).
109 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 292 n.6 (1965).
110 Id. at 286.
11 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
112 See, e.g., Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168 (1959).
113 381 US. 657 (1965).




- Pennington, however ,involved allegations of a conspiracy to elimi-
nate product market competition"16 and is accordingly distinguishable
from a common interest lockout where employers are normally con-
cerned only with collective bargaining aims. While courts have been
notoriously reticent about stating the rationale of labor antitrust deci-
sions,"7 it would seem clear that the primary purpose of antitrust regu-
lation of-collective bargaining is to prevent the use of the labor exemp-
tion to shield deliberate interference with the product market."8 Since
this factor is not present in the common interest lockout, there would
appear to be no excuse for bringing in the confusion of the labor anti-
trust decisions to augment the confusion of the lockout decisions.
II
USE OF THE LOCKOUT AS AN ECONOMIC SANCTION
DURING BARGAINING
Before American Ship, the Board claimed to have a rule which
prohibited bargaining lockouts, although commentators questioned
whether the Board did not, in fact, permit those bargaining lockouts
which it approved under its amorphous doctrine of "defensive" lock-
outs. 19 In American Ship, however, the Court stated unequivocally
"that where the intention proven is merely to bring about a settlement
of a labor dispute on favorable terms, no violation of § 8(a)(3) is
shown."20
Limitations upon the employer's new freedom to engage in a bar-
gaining lockout have not yet been established. The Supreme Court
opinibn specifically limited the scope of American Ship to the use of a
temporary layoff of employees after an impasse had been reached in
negotiations, and did not deal with the use of replacements.' 2 ' Other
limitations have been suggested by the commentators 22 and by dicta in
Board or court opinions. 23
116 Id. at 665, 666.
f17 Bernhardt, The Allen Bradley Doctrine: An Accommodation of Conflicting Pol-
icies, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1094, 1097-1101 (1962); see also Winter, Collective Bargaining and
Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YAME L.J. 14,
57-59 (1963).
118 Bernhardt, supra note 117, at 1107-09.
119 See Meltzer, supra note 3, at 101; Oberer, supra note 3, at 196-99; see also notes 8
& 26 and accompanying text supra.
120 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 813 (1965).
121 Id. at 808.
122 Oberer, supra note 3, at 228.
123 See, e.g., Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969), aff'g.Darling &g.Co. 171
N.L.R.B. No. 95, 68 L.R.R.M. 1133 (May 23, 1968).
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A. The Pre-Impasse Bargaining Lockout
The original decision in Body & Tank Corp., 24 which involved a
pre-impasse bargaining lockout, preceded Brown and American Ship
and was reached under the Board's rule that all bargaining lockouts
were invalid. The trial examiner had specifically found that there was
no impasse at the time of the employer's lockout. 25 His decision that
the lockout was invalid was adopted in relevant part by the Board and
affirmed by the Second Circuit. 20 After American Ship and on rehear-
ing before the Second Circuit, the general counsel argued that the
Board's decision should be reaffirmed in spite of American Ship because
there was no impasse before lockout. 27 The Court in a short per curiam
opinion set aside its previous enforcement of the Board's order without
answering the general counsel's argument. 28 Although the brevity of
the opinion makes the holding unclear, this case may be interpreted as
a validation of a pre-impasse bargaining lockout.
Subsequently, the Board itself reversed a decision in which it had
previously found a violation of the NLRA based on a bargaining lock-
out. 29 The trial examiner had found that "something of an impasse
had been reached in bargaining [but that] negotiations were continu-
ing."' 30 The case was dismissed when neither the charging party nor the
general counsel responded to a notice to show cause.
In Detroit News' 3' the Board ruled that a bargaining lockout could
be justified where negotiations had reached a stage called "deadlock."' 32
The Board, however, did not indicate in what way deadlock differed
from impasse, and.the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming the
Board's decision found the two words to be synonymous.
In United States Sugar Corp.3 3 the Board decided that it was not
necessary to exhaust all possibilities of reaching agreement before de-
claring a lockout. The parties had reached impasse on several issues and
negotiations were broken off. The employer made a suggestion for a
124 144 N.L.R.B. 1414 (1963), aff'd, 339 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1964).
125 Id. at 1423.
126 Body & Tank Corp. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1964).
127 Brief for Respondent at 17-35, Body & Tank Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 330 (2d-Cir.
1965).
128 Body & Tank Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1965).
129 J.R. Simplot Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 171 (1963), remanded, 52 CCH LAB. CAS. 16,579
(9th Cir. 1965), dismissed, CCH 1965 LAB. L. REP. (NLRB Dec.) 9775.
130 145 N.L.R.B. at 176.
131 Evening News Ass'n, 145 N.L.R.B. 996 (1964), enforcement denied sub nom. Detroit
Newspaper Publishers Ass'nv. NLRB, 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965), vacated and remanded,
382 U.S. 374 (1966), on remand, 166 N.L.R.B. 219 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Newspaper Drivers'
Local 372 v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 923 (969).
132 See notes 74-83 and accompanying text supra.
13 169 NJL.P.B. 11 (1968).
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long term contract which ultimately broke the impasse. However, since
the union had not responded favorably to this suggestion for several
days, the Board found no violation in the lockout.
The Board expressly established in the Darling & Co.134 case the
principle that a pre-impasse bargaining lockout is not a per se violation
of the NLRA. There the parties had been bargaining for twenty years
and the union had a history of calling strikes during the busy season.
During the most recent negotiation the union had called a four-month
strike which caused the employer to lose most of the year's business.
The parties had bargained for two months and had reached agreement
on several points but remained in disagreement on others. Fearing a
strike during his busy season not only because of past history but also
because of remarks of the union negotiators, the employer declared a
lockout to pressure the union to come to terms.
The general counsel conceded that the employer had bargained in
good faith. The sole question, therefore, was whether the employer's use
of a lockout violated the NLRA. 3 5 The examiner found no impasse
and, despite militant statements by union negotiators, he found that the
employer knew there was no danger of strike until the busy season,
several months away. He concluded that the lockout violated sections
8 (a) (1) and (3) of the NLRA.
The Board reversed the trial examiner on the ground that absence
of an impasse did not make a bargaining lockout a per se violation: the
presence or absence of an impasse is rather just one element to be
considered in determining the legality of a lockout. The Board found
no evidence of unlawful motivation on the part of the employer. Fi-
nally, in view of the extensive negotiations that had taken place and the
employer's legitimate concern over the possible timing of a strike, the
Board concluded "that the lockout here was neither inherently prej-
udicial to union interests nor devoid of significant economic justifica-
tion."13 6
The Board's decision was enforced by the District of Columbia
Circuit. 3 7 The court agreed that it would be anomalous to adopt a per
se-approach after the Supreme Court had indicated the desirability of
134 171 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 68 L.R.R.M. 1133 (May 23, 1968), aff'd sub nom. Lane v.
NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
The Board's ruling that a bargaining lockout before impasse is not necessarily a viola-
tion of the Act was reaffirmed in Bagel Bakers Council, 174 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 70 L.R.R.M.
1301 (Feb. 19, 1969). modified, 75 L.R.R.M. 2718 (2d Cir. 1970), in which a violation was
found on other grounds. See text accompanying note 198 infra.
135 68 L.R.R.M. at 1135.
136 Id.
187 Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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a more flexible approach in Great Dane and Fleetwood,138 and held that
the employer's "'legitimate and substantial' business interests justif[ied]
whatever comparatively slight impact the lockout in this case may have
had on employee rights."1 39
In Darling the Board stated that bargaining lockout cases must be
decided individually and, reiterating the formula of American Ship,
that the test was whether the lockout" '[was] inherently so prejudicial to
union interests and so devoid of significant economic justification that
no specific evidence of intent ... is required.' ",140 This formula, how-
ever, does not provide any firm answers and may even, as one commen-
tator has suggested, serve only to confuse the issue. 41 Although the
District of Columbia Circuit suggested that a new, more flexible ap-
proach had been devised by the Supreme Court in Great Dane,42 the
court did not offer any clear indication of the nature of standards under
this new approach.
The Board's ruling that the lack of impasse does not itself make
a bargaining lockout a violation seems unobjectionable. There appears
to be no justification for requiring employers to bargain to impasse
before declaring a lockout while allowing unions to strike at any time.
Nevertheless, the Darling decision is a qualified one. The Board noted
in finding no violation of the Act that "the Employer was legitimately
concerned over timing of any possible work stoppage."'143 Thus one
possible interpretation of Darling is that a pre-impasse bargaining lock-
out is justified only where an employer has reason to fear an ill-timed
strike.'4
Such a narrow interpretation seems unlikely, however, in view of
the freedom which the Board has allowed employers in such cases as
Hess Oil & Chemical Corp.145 and Guardian Glass Co.,140 and the Su-
preme Court's explicit statement "that where the intention proven is
merely to bring about a settlement of a labor dispute on favorable
188 Id. at 1211, citing NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967), and NLRB
v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
139 418 F.2d at 1212, quoting American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311
(1965).
140 68 L.R.R.M. at 1135.
141 Summers, supra note 3, at 71. See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
142 418 F.2d at 1211-12.
143 68 L.R.R.M. at 1135 (footnote omitted).
144 See Baird, supra note 3, at 420-21.
145 167 N.L.R.B. 115 (1967), aff'd, 415 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
916 (1970). See notes 157-68 and accompanying text infra.




terms, no violation of § 8 (a) (3) is shown."'147 That such an interpre-
tation is possible, however, indicates the meager guidance the Darling
opinions give. Neither the Board nor the court stated any rules or
standards other than the ambiguous weighing process enunciated by the
Supreme Court in American Ship. The opinion, therefore, tells us very
little more than that the lockout before impasse "in all the circum-
stances of this case" is not a violation. 48
B. The Use of Replacements or Diversion of Work During a Bargain-
ing Lockout
An employer may have work performed in several ways during a
lockout. He may continue operation at the locked out facility using
temporary replacements 149 or supervisors, or he may direct the work to
another of his facilities which is not shut down. The employer may also
use some combination of replacements, supervisors, and diversion.
-The Supreme Court in its American Ship opinion specifically
reserved for later decision the issue of the use of replacements in a
bargaining lockout. 150 The possibility of continuing operations through
diversion of work was not considered. It was the latter issue which arose
in the Ruberoid Co. case.151 Ruberoid involved negotiations for a first
contract with the Gypsum Workers Union at the employer's Tampa
plant. The employer had negotiated with the union at its Savannah
plant for more than twelve years and at its Mobile plant for more than
twenty years. Negotiations started with the submission of a written
contract proposal by the union in January, and the parties were at
impasse by March. At an April meeting the employer told the union
that it would lock out its employees in support of its bargaining posi-
tion unless the union either accepted the employer's most recent pro-
posal or agreed that there would be no multi-plant work stoppage.
When the union did not agree to either of the employer's demands, the
employer laid off its Tampa employees. It continued to negotiate with
the union and reached agreement in August. During the period of the
lockout, the employer served some of the customers it normally served
147 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 313 (1965).
148 See NLRB, THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 24-25, 80-81 (1968).
149 It would be theoretically possible for an employer to continue operations during a
bargaining lockout using permanent replacements. Such a course, however, would dearly
be coercive and it has not been seriously argued that it would be permitted. For a discus-
sion of the possible use of permanent replacements in defense of a multi-employer unit, see
text accompanying notes 109-12 supra.
150 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308 (1965); see Oberer, supra note
%a 16270-23. .
151 167 N.L.R.B. 987 (1967).
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from the Tampa plant from its other two facilities. There was no evi-
dence, however, that the employer either increased production at these
other two plants or used additional employees.
The trial examiner agreed arguendo with the contention of the
general counsel that a lockout with the use of replacements would
constitute an NLRA violation, butfound that, although the employer
had served some of his Tampa customers from his other plants, there
was no showing that he had hired additional employees or altered his
operations at these other plants. The examiner concluded that the
employer was within his rights in maintaining normal operations at the
other plants and in serving "any customer anywhere from such normal
operations."'15 2 In addition, whatever might be the general rule as to
first negotiations, 5 3 both parties in this case were aware of the em-
ployer's successful history of collective bargaining with the union at
other plants. Accordingly, the lockout was not invalidated in that it
occurred during first negotiations. The Board adopted the trial exam-
iner's opinion. 154
The Inland Trucking case held that the use of temporary replace-
ments in a bargaining lockout violates the NLRA at least where the
employer has no business justification other than his desire to secure a
better bargain. 55 There have been no subsequent decisions exploring
the circumstances, if any, in which the use of temporary replacements
in a bargaining lockout would be justified.
The lines drawn in Ruberoid and Inland Trucking represent an
attempt to allow the employer sufficient flexibility to protect his legiti-
mate interests while denying the employer a weapon so devastating
that the union's only alternative would be to give in to his demands.
Thus, it was permissible in Ruberoid to divert -work to another plant
so long as the level of operations at the other plant was not changed;
but Inland Trucking forbade the use of temporary replacements where
the employer had no justification other than his desire to secure a better
bargain. Under the circumstances of these cases the rules made sense.
152 Id. at 993.
153 See notes 156-77 and accompanying text infra.
154 The temporary diversion of work allowed in Ruberoid should be distinguished
from a permanent diversion of work for economic reasons. Before an employer could under-
take such a permanent diversion it would have to bargain with the union as to its in-
tended action. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), modified, 138
N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), aff'd, 332 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), af'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). Any
diversion of work, temporary or permanent, for the purpose of undermining the union
would constitute a violation. Bagel Bakers Council, 174 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 70 L.R.R.M.
1301 (Feb. 19, 1969), modified, 75 L.R.R.M. 2718 (2d Cir. 1970).
155 See notes 81-92 and accompanying text supra.
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In other circumstances, however, the same rules could have entirely
different effects on the balance of power between the parties.
Imagine a textile company producing cloth at a number of loca-
tions, some union and some nonunion, and selling it under a single
brand name. The employer takes a tough position in negotiations,
listening to union arguments and modifying certain proposals, but
nevertheless offering the union a package that is no better than that
given to employees at its nonunion plants. When the union refuses to
accept parity with the nonunion plants, the employer declares a lock-
out. During the lockout, the employer continues to service all his
customers from his other plants. This tactic would seem to be permissi-
ble under the Ruberoid rule and yet would probably be just as effective
in forcing capitulation as would the use of temporary replacements.
On the other hand, imagine a group of small metal fabricators who
desire some variations from the contract presented to them by the
Steelworkers Union. The union has refused to bargain with them on a
group basis and has refused the variations they desire. When the union
strikes one of the fabricators, the others wish to declare a lockout and
to use temporary replacements. In these circumstances the union surely
would not have to capitulate.
Perhaps because of such possibilities the Board has carefully
limited its decisions to the peculiar facts of the cases before it. What
such an approach gains in flexibility, however, it loses in certainty and
predictability. If the Board fails to provide more definite rules, the law
will not be serving its purpose of providing a guide to the conduct of
the parties.
C. Lockouts in Negotiation of a First Contract
It has been suggested that the Board might use a somewhat tougher
standard to govern the use of a lockout in bargaining over a first con-
tract.156 Although language used in some of the Board's opinions gives
some support to this position, the Board has not used a significantly
tougher standard for judging the legality of lockouts in first contract
negotiations.
Hess'57 was the first case involving a bargaining lockout in first
negotiations decided by the Board after American Ship. The case had
initially found a violation of the-Board's rule that only defensive lock-
outs were permissible. 158 On reconsideration the Board found that the
156 Oberer, supra note 3, at 228-29.
157 Hess Oil & Chem. Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 115 (1967), aff'd, 415 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916 (1970).
158 Hess Oil & Chem. Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1097-1105 (1964).
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lockout was not a violation, even though the employer had engaged in
hard bargaining and had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA
by insisting on a change in the contractual unit.159
The Hess Oil Corporation had purchased an oil refining plant
from the Delhi-Taylor Oil Corporation which had a contract with the
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union. Hess agreed to bargain
with the union but not to accept the Delhi-Taylor contract.160 Negotia-
tions started on March 8. Hess insisted that if agreement was not
reached by March 25, it would not continue production when it took
over on April 1. On March 28, the parties had reached impasse on a
number of issues including employer demands for a sixty-day probation-
ary period during which employees could be discharged without a
right to grieve, and for exclusion from the bargaining unit of laboratory
and warehouse employees. On April 1, all employees were terminated
and operations were shut down. On May 7, the employer started opera-
tions again, hiring back the old employees, except for one who had
reached retirement age and eight who had physical defects. Terms and
conditions of employment were determined unilaterally by the em-
ployer.161 The parties continued to negotiate until May 28, evidently
without reaching agreement.
The trial examiner found that both sides had negotiated in a good
faith attempt to reach agreement, that the appropriate unit for bargain-
ing included laboratory and warehouse employees, and that, by insis-
tence to impasse upon exclusion of these employees from the unit, Hess
had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA. The examiner
further found that the purpose of the shutdown from April 1 to May 7
was to compel the union to accept the employer's bargaining proposals.
Following the then rule prohibiting lockouts to compel acceptance of
a bargaining position, he found violations of sections 8(a)(1), (3), and
(5).162 The Board adopted this opinion with minor changes. 163
Subsequent to American Ship, however, the Board reconsidered
its decision and reversed its finding that the lockout violated the Act.
The Board reasoned that a lockout could not "be deemed unlawful
simply because it was offensive, rather than defensive, in nature, or
because it was designed, after impasse had been reached on legitimate
bargaining proposals, to force acceptance of such proposals."'164 In this
159 167 N.L.R.B. at 117.
160 148 N.L.R.B. at 1082-85.
161 Id. at 1085-95.
162 Id. at 1097-1105.
163 Id. at 1080-81.
164 167 N.L.R.B. at 116.
1972]
CORNELL. LAW REVIEW
case, moreover, there was no doubt that an impasse existed. The Board
concluded, as the union had conceded, that "[w]ere these the only
issues in this case, the American Ship Building decision would clearly
require dismissal."1 65
There were, however, a number of factors that distinguished this
case from American Ship. Not only was this a first negotiation, but the
employer through a pattern of hard bargaining, including the lockout,
had put the union in a position where its continued viability as a
bargaining agent was in doubt.166 The union was unable to stop the
unilateral imposition of terms and conditions of employment and was
unable to protect several of its members whose employment was termi-
nated at the sole discretion of the employer. Although the employer
might have taken unilateral action without the lockout after impasse
had been reached, the use of the lockout certainly reduced the union's
chance of organizing effective resistance to such unilateral changes.
None of these matters is even mentioned in the Board's opinion.
The Board did, however, discuss the relevance of the employer's
insistence that laboratory and warehouse employees be excluded from
the unit, reaffirming its earlier decision that an employer's refusal to
deal with the established, appropriate unit violated the NLRA. Since
the parties had postponed consideration of this issue, however, it had
not contributed to the impasse. The employer had not made the de-
mand to disrupt negotiations and the union had not rejected the
employer's proposals solely or even primarily because of the unit issue.
The Board concluded:
In view of these circumstances, we are convinced that Respondent
would have locked out its employees even if the issue as to the unit
status of laboratory and warehouse employees had been withdrawn
from negotiations, and we find that Respondent's position on that
issue did not materially motivate its decision to lock out its em-
ployees.
In view of the foregoing and as the record indicates that-
Respondent was not motivated by union animus or in furtherance
of an unlawful bargaining position, we find that Respondent's
lockout did not violate Section 8(a)(3) or (1) of the Act.167
165 Id.
166 In fact, the union did reach agreement with the employer in 1963 and there have
been three extensions of that agreement. Letter from Clifford Potter, Director, Region 23,
NLRB, to the Author, Jan. 14, 1971. If the NLRB doubted that the effects upon the union
were not so devastating as they seemed, however, it was not indicated.
167 167 N.LR.B. at 117.
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The Fifth Circuit sustained the Board's decision, denying appeals by
both the employer and the union.168
The next first negotiation lockout case decided by the Board was
Ruberoid Co.'6 9 In that case the trial examiner cited Professor Oberer's
discussion of the possible implications of a bargaining lockout in first
negotiations 70 but found that since the employer had a successful
history of bargaining in two other plants, the fact of first negotiations
was insufficient to invalidate the lockout.
First negotiations were again involved in Guardian Glass Co.,71'
which involved negotiations by a successor employer who had taken
over an operation that was losing money. At an employee meeting the
company showed a movie about another plant that had been brought
from bankruptcy to a state of thriving efficiency. Company representa-
tives described in detail the unsound economic status of the recently ac-
quired plant and indicated that drastic changes and union cooperation
would be necessary. At a subsequent meeting the company proposed a
three-year contract with no pay increases and a moratorium on pension
payments. When the union rejected the company proposals, company
negotiators threatened to close the plant, but later agreed to allow the
union five days to reconsider the company proposals and offered the
union a cost of living escalator clause. Union members voted to reject
the company proposals and a shutdown was ordered. Negotiations with
the International were then discontinued and the company attempted
to negotiate with the Local.
The trial examiner found that the "take it or leave it" attitude of
company negotiators and their threats to close the plant constituted bad
faith bargaining. Since the lockout was in support of a bargaining
position which was not in good faith, it too violated the NLRA. The
trial examiner also held that company attempts to negotiate with the
Local violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The Board reversed the trial examiner and dismissed the com-
plaint. It found that the employer had bargained in good faith, noting
the employer's immediate recognition of the union and its attempts
subsequent to the lockout to reach agreement. The Board also upheld
the validity of the shutdown on the ground that the employer was
motivated only by legitimate economic considerations. The Board
168 Hess Oil & Chem. Corp. v. NLR.B, 415 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1969).
169 167 N.L.R.B. 987 (1967).
170 Id. at 992, citing Oberer, supra note 3, at 228-29.
171 172 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 68 L.R...M. 1323 (June 26, 1968).
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rejected the examiner's finding of a section 8(a)(1) violation for encour-
aging bargaining through the Local rather than the International. 172
Wantagh Auto Sales, Inc.173 involved first negotiations with the
United Auto Workers after they had intervened and been elected in a
decertification proceeding involving the Teamsters Union. The em-
ployer entered into negotiations with the new union on July 21, pre-
sented his final offer on July 27 and, when the union did not accept it,
declared a lockout on July 28. The employees were allowed to return
on October 16 and agreement was reached on November 27. There was
some evidence that the employer harbored resentment against one
particular employee who had started the decertification proceeding and
later served on the new negotiating committee.17 The examiner, how-
ever, did not discuss the significance of this resentment or even of the
new union; he merely found that no violation had occurred and the
Board adopted his findings.
Except for Ruberoid, where the Board noted the employer's
history of successful bargaining with the same union at other plants,
the Board has ignored the factor of first negotiations. In two cases the
Board found no violation in a first negotiation lockout despite an
extremely tough bargaining stance and the commission of an unfair
labor practice on the part of the employer.175 In a third case the em-
ployer's evident preference for the union he had formerly been dealing
with and his resentment against the individual who started decertifica-
tion proceedings against that union did not preclude a finding of no
violation. 176 In no case was the context of first negotiation a significant
factor. 77
Thus there are a number of cases which imply that no special,
higher standard applies to first negotiation cases. The Board, however,
has never articulated its reasons for not finding this factor relevant.
172 68 L.R.R.M. at 1325.
173 177 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 72 L.R.R.M. 1541 (June 27, 1969).
174 Id. at 10-11 (trial examiner's decision).
175 Hess Oil & Chem. Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 115 (1967), aIJ'd, 415 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916 (1970) (text accompanying notes 157-68 supra); Guardian
Glass, 172 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 68 L.R.R.M. 1323 (June 26, 1968) (text accompanying notes
171-72 supra).
176 Wantagh Auto Sales, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 72 L.R.R.M. 1541 (June 27, 1969)
(text accompanying notes 173-74 supra).
177 Terrace Lumber Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1109 (1965), involved both an illegal lockout
of employees who had just designated the union as their representative and a refusal by the
employer to bargain. In response to the request for union recognition the employer an-
nounced that he had no work for the employees and refused to discuss the matter further.
Although first negotiation was involved, it was only ancillary to the Board's finding of a
dear violation of the NLRA.
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Again, it would seem highly desirable that the Board delineate useful
guidelines in this area to aid both unions and employers.
III
LOCKOUTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Does action amounting to an unfair labor practice taken by an em-
ployer at the same time as the lockout make the lockout illegal? The
Board's answer is that a lockout may be legal despite unfair labor
practices if the purpose of the lockout is to support a legitimate bar-
gaining position and not to support the unfair practices. On the other
hand, if the purpose of the lockout is to support an illegal bargaining
position or to undermine or weaken the union, the lockout will consti-
tute a violation.
Golden State Bottling Co.178 is an early case upholding the valid-
ity of an employer lockout despite a pattern of unfair labor practices.
Golden State was decided by the Board before, and modified by the
Ninth Circuit after, American Ship. The employer had locked out
employees to force agreement on his terms and had also interfered in
the union's internal affairs to promote that agreement. After reaching
a deadlock in negotiations with union leaders, the employer threatened
to refuse further work to his employees after the old contract expired.
He encouraged dissident union members to elect new officers in order
to reach agreement with him, which they did on the day of the lockout.
After his refusal to reemploy the old union leaders unless they signed
the new contract, they conceded to his terms. Four months later the
employer discharged one of the former union leaders for union activ-
ity, giving a minor violation of plant rules as justification for his
actionY 9
The trial examiner found that one of the purposes of the lockout
was to coerce employees into selecting union leaders who would accept
the employer's terms. Thus the examiner did not rely upon the rule
that any offensive lockout was a violation, but specifically grounded his
finding on the employer's purpose of undermining the union leader-
ship.180 This finding was confirmed in pertinent part by the Board.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board's finding
that the lockout constituted a violation, since there was no evidence of
178 147 N.L.R.B. 410 (1964), modified, 353 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1965).
179 Id. at 415-19.
180 Id. at 417.
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wrongful motivation on the part of the employer, nor any showing that
disruption of the functioning of the union was a necessary consequence
of the lockout.'"" The court affirmed the Board's findings that the em-
ployer had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) by discharging a union
leader s2 and section 8(a)(2) by assisting a dissident union group. 8 3
Safeway Stores, Inc.,8 4 involving a lockout in defense of a multi-
employer bargaining unit, presented similar issues. The employer had
threatened the employees with discharge if they picketed. The examiner
concluded that because of the threats the lockout was illegal. The Board
specifically overruled the examiner, ruling that although the threats
violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, they did not change the defensive
character of the lockout. The Board, however, found that the lockout
lost its defensive character, and thus violated the Act because of the use
of temporary replacements. After Brown the Board reversed its finding
of violation.
The Hess case'8 5 indicates that even an illegal bargaining position
on the part of an employer will not necessarily invalidate a lockout. The
employer in Hess had violated the Act by insisting on a change in unit.
The Board, however, found that this insistence had not contributed to
the impasse in negotiations, and that the lockout was not primarily in
support of this illegal position. Accordingly, and since the Board other-
wise found the employer's bargaining to be in good faith, the lockout
did not constitute a violation.
Finally, in United States Pipe & Foundry Co. 8 6 the Board held that
a bargaining lockout did not violate the Act, even though during the
same bargaining the employer had attempted to use an illegal tactic
181 NLRB v. Golden State Bottling Co., 353 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1965).
182 Id. at 669. It is obvious from the findings of the trial examiner and the Board
that the intent to undermine the union leadership was an important determinant of the
employer's conduct. In these circumstances, that the employer also sought to further his
bargaining goals should not make the lockout valid. See text accompanying notes 206-10
infra.
183 Id. at 670. Although the Board did not appeal Golden State to the Supreme Court,
it did find violations of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA in the use of a lockout in a
subsequent, similar case. Tonkin Corp., 147 N.L.R.B. 401 (1964), remanded, 352 F.2d 509
(9th Cir. 1965), on remand, 158 N.L.R.B. 1223 (1966), enforced, 392 F.2d 141 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 838 (1968); see text accompanying notes 192-95 infra. The Ninth
Circuit's enforcement of Tonkin undermines its holding in Golden State.
184 148 N.L.R.B. 660 (1964), vacated in part, CCH 1965 LAB. L. REP. (NLRB Dec.)
9694.
185 Hess Oil & Chem. Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 115 (1967), af'd, 415 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916 (1970); see notes 157-68 and accompanying text supra.
186 180 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 73 L.R.R.M. 1260 (Dec. 16, 1969), enforced sub nom. Molders
Local 155 v. NLRB, 76 L.R.R.M. 2133 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 5, 1971). See text accompanying notes
218-19 infra.
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in support of his bargaining position. Before declaring a lockout the
employer had attempted to pressure the union into acceding to his
demands by lowering the employees' wages and benefits. The Board
ruled the tactic illegal but found that it did not taint the subsequent
lockout.
Where the lockout is directly and primarily in support of unfair
labor practices, however, a violation will generally be found. Cases so
holding may be divided into three categories: (1) where the lockout is
in direct support of bad faith bargaining by the employer; (2) where
an employer attempts to use a lockout either to control or dominate
a union or to undermine employee support for it; and, (3) where the
lockout is used to punish employees for union activity.
American Stores Packing Co. 187 illustrates the first category.
American Stores involved impasse in negotiation caused by the
employer's refusal to discuss the union's bargaining proposals. Union
wage proposals were based on rates of packinghouses in the immediate
vicinity, while the employer's proposals were based on wage rates in
effect at the four largest packers. 8 The parties had been negotiating
for several months. During discussions on February 22, the union stood
ready to negotiate both proposals, but management representatives
believed discussion of union proposals would be a waste of time. Union
representatives threatened to strike if no agreement was reached by
midnight, February 25. On February 23 the employer locked the em-
ployees out. The union struck and the parties continued negotiations.
The employer refused to agree to any of the union's proposals. On
March 22 the employees offered to return to work, but the employer
refused to allow them to return until agreement had been reached.
Within twelve days the union agreed to the employer's proposals and
the employees returned to work.
The trial examiner found that the employer had engaged in bad
faith bargaining and that the lockout violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), and
(5) of the NLRA. The Board adopted the relevant portion of the ex-
aminer's decision. On remand after American Ship, the Board reaffirmed
its earlier decision:
[W]e find that the Respondent locked out its employees, and re-
fused to reinstate them, not for "the sole purpose of bringing
187 142 N.L.R.B. 711 (1963), remanded, 351 F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1965), on remand, 158
N.L.R.B. 620 (1966).
188 The employer wanted his contract to embody terms similar to those in the Denver,
Colorado contracts of Armour, Wilson, Swift, and Cudahy. The union, on the other hand,
wanted to negotiate contracts similar to those then in existence between the union and
Denver area packinghouses owned by supermarkets. 142 N.L.R.B. at 716.
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pressure to bear in support of [its] legitimate bargaining position,"
but rather as a means of evading its duty to bargain by attempting
through coercive pressure on the employees to compel union acqui-
escence in Respondent's unlawful restriction of the scope of bar-
gaining.'i 9
Port Norris Express Co.19o also involved a lockout in support of
a bad faith bargaining position. The employer's truck drivers had been
represented by the Teamsters for a period of over twenty years. The
agreements between the parties during this period were in the form of
short memorandums covering wages, holidays, and vacations. During
negotiations in February 1968, the union presented the employer with
a more complete contract proposal and the employer refused to con-
sider it. After the union members rejected the employer's more limited
proposal, the employer began a lockout. Negotiations continued, with
the employer still refusing to consider the union's proposal. In April,
agreement was finally reached and the employees returned to work.
The examiner ordered payment of lost wages, finding that the lockout
violated section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA because it was in support of the
employer's refusal to bargain. His decision was adopted by the Board.
The Tonkin Corp. case' 91 coupled an illegal lockout with employer
interference in the internal affairs of an independent union and a dis-
criminatory discharge. The employer had been negotiating with the
Independent for a number of years. When no agreement was reached
during negotiations in 1963, he informed the employees that there
would be no work after April 1 without a signed contract and that he
did not want to deal with the Teamsters Union. By April 1 nine em-
ployees had submitted authorization cards to the Teamsters, and on
that date the employer locked out the employees. After some objection
the employees returned to work and the leaders signed the contract.
On April 2 the Teamsters filed a representation petition seeking an
election among the employees. Without authorization the employer
forwarded a copy of the contract to the regional office of the NLRB in
the name of the independent union to indicate interest in the proceed-
ing. On April 8 the employer received a copy of unfair labor practice
charges filed by the Independent, and on the following day he dis-
charged a leader of the Independent who had solicited cards for the
Teamsters.
The examiner found that the employer had violated sections 8
189 158 N.L.R.B. at 623.
190 174 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 70 L.R.R.M. 1339 (Feb. 14, 1969).
191 147 N.L.R.B. 401 (1964), remanded, 352 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1965), on remand, 158
N.L.R.B. 1223 (1966), enforced, 392 F.2d 141 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 838 (1968).
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(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the NLRA. He ordered the employer to reinstate
the discharged employee, to cease recognizing the Independent, and
to reimburse employees for union dues paid to the Independent under
a union security clause since April 1. The Board adopted his decision. 192
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order con-
cerning the discharge but remanded the rest of the case for reconsidera-
tion in light of American Ship.193
On remand the Board reaffirmed its earlier decision that the em-
ployer had violated section 8(a)(2) by forcing a new contract to subvert
the independent union and avoid the Teamsters. The Board also found
that the lockout was an integral part of the employer's course of illegal
conduct and, therefore, itself illegal. 194 The Board's decision was en-
forced by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 195
The Board has consistently held that a lockout designed to under-
mine employee support for a union is prohibited by the NLRA.196
Thus, for example, in Weinstein Electric Corp.197 a violation was
found in a lockout used both in support of an employer bad faith
bargaining position and in an attempt to force employees into a rival
union. In Bagel Bakers Council'98 the Board found a similar violation
in a lockout used in support of a bad faith bargaining position and as
an instrument to transfer work from union to nonunion employees.
The Board has also found that the use of a lockout to punish em-
ployees for strike activity violates the NLRA. Thus in Serv-Air, Inc.199
the Board adopted the examiner's finding that an employer had vio-
lated the Act by using a lockout as punishment for returning strikers.
The examiner had rejected the employer's claim that he could not use
the returning strikers. 200 In O'Daniel Oldsmobile, Inc. 201 the Board
found a violation when the employer selectively locked out only those
employees who had previously been on strike.
The Board has thus drawn a distinction between those cases where
an employer happens to commit unfair labor practices at the same time
192 147 N.L.R.B. at 401-02.
103 NLRB v. Tonkin Corp., 352 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1965).
194 158 N.L.R.B. at 1223.
195 Tonkin Corp. v. NLRB, 392 F.2d 141 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 US. 838 (1968).
196 See, e.g., Terrace Lumber Co., 154 N.L.RB. 1109 (1965); note 177 supra.
197 152 N.L.R.B. 25 (1965).
198 174 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 70 L.R.R.M. 1301 (Feb. 19, 1969), modified, 75 L.R.R.M.
2718 (2d Cir. 1970).
199 161 N.L.R.B. 382 (1966), enforced in part, 395 F.2d 557 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 840 (1968).
200 161 N.L.R.B. at 415.
201 179 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 72 L.R.R.M. 1526 (Oct. 28, 1969).
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as he is legitimately using a lockout and those cases where the lockout
is in support of unfair labor practices. In the latter category are cases
where the employer had no legitimate interests to further by use of the
lockout, where the Board concluded that the claimed legitimate inter-
ests were no more than a pretext, or where the employer's interests
were mixed and the illegitimate ones were primary.
The easiest cases are those in which the employer has no legitimate
interest to defend by his lockout. Such a situation occurs when the
employer openly refuses to bargain with the union, either because he
simply prefers not to engage in collective bargaining20 2 or prefers
another union.2 0 3 No balancing process is necessary to find that such
a lockout is illegal.
Only a shade more difficult are those cases where the allegedly
legitimate reasons put forward by the employer are judged to be a
pretext. Clearly, a false justification given by an employer cannot be
allowed to legitimatize an attempt to undermine collective bargaining.
In Serv-Air the employer's stated reason was found to be a pretext
because his economic situation was not as he claimed.204 Presumably,
however, even a legitimate interest would not protect an employer if
the evidence indicated that such interest had not been part of his
motivation for the lockout.20 5
The problem of mixed motive cases has long been a cause of con-
cern even for those otherwise satisfied with Board procedures.20 6 In
deciding these cases the Board has tended to give employers the benefit
of the doubt. Where the facts indicate the presence of both a legal and
an illegal purpose for a bargaining lockout the Board has found a
violation only where the employer has openly stated his illegal goal
and where his acts indicate that this was one of his primary purposes.
In American Stores and Port Norris the employers had mixed
motives for their lockouts: to secure an agreement and illegally to
restrict bargaining. In both cases the employers were willing to discuss
their own proposals but openly refused to discuss legitimate proposals
made by union representatives. Clearly, in these circumstances a lockout
could become a convenient method for an employer to avoid his
202 See, e.g., Terrace Lumber Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1109 (1965); note 177 supra.
203 See, e.g., Weinstein Elec. Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 25 (1965); text accompanying note 197
supra.
204 See text accompanying notes 199-200 supra.
205 A recent article which takes a strong position against the use of motive as a de-
terminant nevertheless indicates that it is sometimes necessary to inquire into motive when
equivocal conduct is involved. Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission
of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YA=E L.J.
1269, 1275 (1968).
206 Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAPv. L. REV. 1401, 1432-33 (1958).
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obligation to bargain. The Board decisions in these cases are unobjec-
tionable.
Two cases in which the issue of mixed motives should have been
given more consideration, however, are Hess and Guardian Glass. In
both of these cases, although there was no direct evidence of an intent
to undermine the union, it was clear on all the facts that although the
employer was ready to sign an agreement on his terms, he would not
have been unhappy if the union withered on the vine.207 An employer is
not guilty of an unfair labor practice merely because he would rather
not deal with a union, and it may be that in these particular cases the
findings of no violation were justified. The Board's failure to give a
more thorough analysis of the issue, however, indicates that the lockout
may prove to be a convenient tool for those employers sophisticated
enough to maintain the formalities of bargaining without its substance.
Although it is easy to be critical of the Board, it should be admitted
that the problem is a difficult one to resolve. One approach would be
to declare, as in Inland Trucking,2 certain employer practices illegal
regardless of motivation. However, such an approach may restrict cer-
tain employers in their conduct of labor relations while leaving others
free to undermine the union.20 9 On the other hand, if the Board were
to retain motivation as a standard and to apply that standard more
harshly to employers with mixed motives, the result might be an
automatic finding of an unfair labor practice whenever the employer
has any ambivalent feelings concerning unions on the record.210 Thus,
neither cure is responsive to the present problem.
Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon the Board at least to confront
the issue of mixed motives. If the Board analyzes this issue more ex-
plicitly, both employers and unions will have a better notion of the
Board's attitude, and open discussion may lead to more innovative
solutions.
IV
CHANGE IN TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AS AN
ECONOMIC SANCTION DURING BARGAINING
Crestline Co.,21 1 which preceded American Ship, was the first case
in which an employer argued that he was privileged to change terms
207 See text accompanying notes 157-68 & 171-72 supra.
208 See text accompanying notes 81-92 supra.
200 See text accompanying notes 155-56 supra.
21o Lev, supra note 3, at 103-05.
211 133 N.L.R.B. 256 (1961).
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and conditions of employment as an economic sanction during bargain-
ing. In Crestline the parties failed to agree on a contract and the
employer unilaterally terminated its contribution to employee group
insurance and payment of holiday wages. The employer relied on
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union,212 a recent case in which the Board
had been reversed for excessively restricting the use of economic wea-
pons during a labor dispute. The Board in Crestline, however, ruled
that an employer must bargain with the union over proposed changes
in conditions of employment, even if they are intended as economic
sanctions during bargaining.21 3 Although the Board clearly ignored the
distinction made in the Insurance Agents' case between conditions
meant to be permanent and those intended as an economic sanction,2 14
the decision was not appealed.
After American Ship the Board decided Laclede Gas Co. 215 on the
same basis as Crestline. In Laclede the employer, without following
contractual seniority, had laid off a number of employees as a sanction
during negotiations. The Board decided that the employer was required
to bargain with the union over any departure from contractual proce-
dures, even if the action were used as an economic sanction.2 16 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, finding no violation in the
employer's failure to bargain, refused to enforce the Board's decision
and remanded the case for decision on the legality of the lockout.217
While Laclede was pending before the Board, United States Pipe
Foundry Co.218 was decided. There the employer had instituted certain
changes in wages and working conditions after first announcing them
to union leaders during bargaining and soliciting their comments. The
examiner rejected the argument that the employer had met the require-
ments of bargaining with the union before instituting the changes. He
ruled that sanctions to be used by the employer-are not a fit subject for
bargaining and that the Supreme Court in the Insurance Agents' case
had distinguished temporary changes meant as economic sanctions from
permanent changes in the terms and conditions of employment. 219
212 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
213 133 N.L.R.B. at 258, citing NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S.
217 (1949).
214 361 U.S. at 496 n.28.
215 173 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 69 L.R.R.M. 1316 (Oct. 22, 1968), remanded, 421 F.2d 610
(8th Cir. 1970), on remand, 187 N.L.R.B. No. 32, 75 L.R.R.M. 1483 (Dec. 14, 1970).
216 69 L.R.R.M. at 1317.
217 Laclede Gas Co. v. NLRB, 421 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1970).
218 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 73 L.R.R.M. 1260 (Dec. 16, 1969), enforced sub nom. Molders
Local 155 v. NLRB, 76 L.R.R.M. 2133 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 5, 1971). See note 53 supra.
219 73 L.R.R.M. at 1261.
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Facing the issue which the Board had managed to avoid previously,
the examiner found that such changes in terms and conditions of em-
ployment were a greater sanction than a lockout. If the employer locked
out the employees, they would be entitled to reinstatement upon settle-
ment of the labor dispute. On the other hand, if the employer was
allowed to make changes in terms of employment as a sanction, this
could virtually force a strike and the employees might then face per-
manent replacement. Such a sanction went beyond American Ship and
constituted illegal interference with employees' rights under section 7
of the NLRA.2 20 The Board adopted the examiner's opinion with one
member dissenting.221
In its decision on remand in Laclede,222 however, the Board did
not consider the relevance of the United States Pipe precedent. The
Board noted that the employer "was not motivated by any desire to
undermine the Union,"2 3 and, citing American Ship and Brown, con-
cluded that "Respondent has sustained its burden of establishing legiti-
mate objectives . . .particularly when one considers that the layoffs
were intended to be, and were, temporary and incidental to what the
Court of Appeals has held to be a lawful, tactical bargaining maneu-
ver."2 24 In his dissenting opinion, Board member Fanning stated that
he felt it improper for the Board "to speculate as to the Respondent's
business justification for ignoring seniority rights."225
It is submitted that the United States Pipe decision embodies the
correct rationale for those cases in which the employer attempts to use
changes in terms and conditions of employment as a sanction. If a
change in terms and conditions is intended as a sanction there can be
no meaningful bargaining. Moreover, to allow such sanctions would
be a clear threat to the rights of employees under section 7 of the NLRA.
220 Id. at 1262. Section 7 of the NLRA reads as follows:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
221 Board member Zagoria's dissent would have allowed the changes and found a re-
sulting strike to be a "constructive" lockout. 73 L.R.R.M. at 1263 (dissenting opinion).
222 Laclede Gas Co., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 32, 75 L.R.R.M. 1483 (Dec. 14, 1970).
223 75 L.R.R.M. at 1484 (footnote omitted).
224 Id.
225 Id. at 1485 (dissenting opinion). This dissent is persuasive. The Board's opinion
listed no business reasons that specifically explained the employer's failure to follow con-
tractual seniority.
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Faced with such sanctions, unions have three unpleasant alternatives:
(1) they can agree to a contract on the employer's terms; (2) they can
allow employees to continue work under terms less favorable than either
their previous contract or the employer's latest offer; or (3) they can
call a strike with the employees subject to permanent replacement.
Clearly, forcing the union to make such a choice could tend to under-
mine collective bargaining. There is no compelling employer interest
that requires the protection afforded by such sanctions.
The majority rule in United States Pipe is more sensible than the
dissent, which would allow the sanctions but declare any resulting strike
a "constructive" lockout.226 That rule would have the anomalous effect
of providing employers with a weapon that could be used only against
weak unions. Thus, if the employer changed terms and conditions of
employment as a sanction, a strong union would almost certainly strike.
The only unions against whom the weapon would be effective would
be those so weak that they dare not strike even though such action
would be offered the protection of being declared a constructive lockout.
Of course, not all changes in terms and conditions of employment
during bargaining are used as sanctions. As to any changes which are
not intended to operate as sanctions, the rule that the employer must
bargain with the union before changing the contractual terms of em-
ployment should apply.
According to these rules the Laclede case was incorrectly decided.
If, on the one hand, the departures from contractual seniority were
sanctions,22 7 the principles of United States Pipe should apply. Although
only some employees were laid off, the union faced the same grim
choice of either asking its members to strike and face permanent replace-
ment, submitting to the employer's unilateral changes, or agreeing to
his contract proposals. A departure from contractual seniority may not
be so great a sanction as, for example, a lowering of wages. But in the
absence of any showing of special circumstances, the relative weakness
of the sanction is no reason for departing from a valid general rule.
If on the other hand, the departure from seniority was not intended
as a sanction, but was simply a change for the convenience of the em-
ployer in making the layoff, then there is no reason why the matter
226 See note 221 supra.
227 In its first Laclede opinion, the Board noted:
Further, the Respondent contends that because the parties had reached an impasse
in the negotiations, it had the right temporarily to lay off employees out of se-
niority, in order to carry on its business and in order to strengthen its hand at-
the negotiating table.
Laclede Gas Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 69 L.R.R.M. 1816 (Oct. 22, 1968) (footnote omitted).
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should not have been discussed with the union. The employer's obliga-
tion to discuss such matters would be limited by the magnitude of the
change, and he would not be obligated to continue discussions if the
union's concern was not the change but the lockout itself. 228 There is,
however, no reason to allow an employer to ignore the normal me-
chanics of collective bargaining in his use of a lockout.229
CONCLUSION
Brown and American Ship gave employers new freedom to use the
lockout as a bargaining weapon. Before those cases were decided, the
use of a lockout was considered an illegal infringement of union and
employee rights except in certain exceptional cases. Those two land-
mark cases declared the lockout valid unless it came within certain
proscribed categories. These categories were defined by two standards:
the presence of union animus and a formula which requires the Board
to balance the employer's economic interest in pursuing the lockout
with the resulting damage to the interests of the union and employees.
Today, despite a number of Board and court decisions, there are sig-
nificant problems in defining the nature of union animus, particularly
where the employer acts from mixed motives. The balancing of interests
test remains an enigma.
Some questions have been answered by Board rulings. The Board
has specifically held that absence of impasse does not make a bargain-
ing lockout an NLRA violation, that temporary replacements in a bar-
gaining lockout constitute a violation in the absence of special circum-
stances, and that the use of changes in terms and conditions of employ-
ment as a sanction during bargaining also violates the Act.
Other questions were answered by the Board without specific con-
sideration in the opinions. Thus, in a series of decisions, some of which
did not even merit an opinion, the Board sanctioned lockouts in defense
of multi-employer units. After creating a concept of joint bargaining,
the Board appears to have abandoned it as a separate category without
specifically so stating. Similarly, the Board considered the relevance of
the factor of first negotiations in one decision, but then apparently
considered it irrelevant in a number of other decisions, again without
specifically so stating. Finally, without acknowledging that it was taking
this position, the Board has chosen to give the employer the benefit of
the doubt in cases of ambiguous motivation for a lockout.
228 Cf. Laclede Gas Co., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 180, 69 L.R.RIM. 1075 (June 14, 1968).
229 See note 95 supra.
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In none of these cases, however, was the underlying basis of deci-
sion clarified. This deficiency makes it more difficult to predict how the
Board will rule in future cases. Moreover, the Board's close qualifica-
tions of its decisions in such cases as Darling and Inland Trucking and
its failure to discuss some of the underlying issues as, for example, in
the first negotiation cases, leave even the decided cases susceptible to
easy reversal. Much of the problem seems to be the inevitable result
of deficiencies in the formulas advanced by the Supreme Court in the
Brown and American Ship decisions. While these deficiencies are sub-
ject to no easy cure, open recognition and discussion of them by the
Board would be a welcome first step towards that goal.
